There are three books, two of recent vintage I'd recommend everyone involved in real estate and housing read. The first is by Richard
Posner, a Federal judge on the 7
th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. When not adjudicating,
Posner writes often on political and economic issues. His latest,
A Failure of Capitalism was part of my summer Econ 6000 class at ECU. It was published this year and thus covers recent economic policy, including TARP and various Obama policies that were floated at the time of publication. It runs 300 pages, but its a small book and easy to read.
The second tome is
Getting Off Track by John B Taylor, a conservative economist most often associated with the Hoover Institution. This book was also released in 2009. It's only 85 pages, but does contain some hefty graphs and economic measurements for the reader to digest.
The final book is
Against the Gods, by Peter Bernstein. Last revised in 1998, this book is actually a history of the concept of risk and risk projection--commencing from games of odds in Roman and Greek culture, the introduction of advanced math brought from the Arabic world (the concept of zero was a major advance) and the nascent practice of using past history to predict future probability. Eventually industries such as modern insurance, and even the hedge and derivative funds evolved as mathematical models became more complex. Ironically, the book ends with a commentary on derivatives and their potential risks and upsides.
What has all this to do with our sand bar? Let's start with Taylor. In his book he points a finger at two concurrent events: artificially low interest rates from the Federal Reserve, coupled with loose lending policies in the mortgage industry. Taylor "invented" the formula by which the Fed should set interest rates, and it is now called the Taylor Rule. In short, the Fed rate should be:
1.5 x the Inflation Rate + 1/2 times the GDP gap (the measurement of where GDP deviates from its normal trend line) plus 1. Thus, if inflation is 5%, the GDP gap 3%, the Fed rate would be 10%; 5 x 1.5=7.5; 3% x .5 = 1.5; plus 1. 7.5 + 1.5 +1 = 10.
From 2001 until mid 2005, the Fed deviated from the Taylor Rule significantly. In 2003 and 2004 the Fed rate was 1%, while the Taylor Rule would have gradually increased the rate from a low of 2% to 4%. By 2006, the Fed and the Taylor rule were in
synch at 5.2%, but only after the Fed increased rates sharply over a very short period of time. This created the "door slamming" effect I mentioned in the previous post.
Many liberal economists blame a worldwide savings glut on the low rates (the more people are willing to save money, the lower the interest rates offered by banks). While the rest of the world did indeed experience a savings glut, the US did not, and our savings rate more than offset the rest of the world. In short, there was no aggregate savings glut.
Typically, very low Fed rates would fuel inflation, and are thus historically rare.
So, how did interest rates stay low and not fuel inflation? The primary answer lies in cheap imports, especially from China, which offset domestic price increases, and the necessity of both Chinese and Middle Eastern governments to recycle and stash excess cash--which they chose to do in US Treasury holdings rather than their own currencies. This demand for US dollar holdings brought down the interest rate on government bonds.
The major European central banks followed suit, and rates became low worldwide. The next problem involved the derivatives used to insure mortgage backed securities. No one agency, national or domestic kept track of these. When the global economy began to contract, central banks misread the problem and tried to unfreeze credit markets by pumping more money into the system. But, liquidity was not the issue as it turns out. It was fear of "
counterparty risk"; if my bank is holding one side of a hedge and my bet turns out correct, would the other bank (which bet the opposite way) have the funds to pay me off? Once mortgages began to default worldwide, the bank-to-bank distrust of whether their counterparts in derivatives were solvent began a rush to cash in those policies, and at the same time, dried up the market for new offerings.
The funding mechanism for mortgages disappeared rapidly.
Using empirical methods, Taylor created a model that demonstrates in the United States, housing starts from 2003 to 2005 would have peaked at 1.7 million annual units in 2003, dropping to 1.5 million in 2005. Instead, housing starts ran from 1.8 million 2003 all the way up to 2 million in 2005. By 2006, starts were 2.1 million when the Taylor Rule would have created only 1.5 million. In short, low interest rates created about 500,000 more housing starts per year over a period of 4 years, giving us our current inventory overhang of more than a million units.
Enter
Posner. He also attributes the problems exactly as Taylor---low Fed rates, a misreading in 2007 of a liquidity crisis when it was actually a "
counterparty risk" aversion, loose lending policies by banks (spurred by demand for housing and some political pressure), and finally, no central oversight of the "big picture"--how loan products, rising home prices, derivatives, mortgage backed securities and other factors were independently driving us over a cliff.
Posner takes a rational approach, and as I mentioned yesterday, joins me in discounting the effects of "greed". Instead, he takes a market psychology approach which says "Everyone acted rational as individual entities, but their collective actions were irrational". The problem? No single government entity was in charge of watching the entire situation. Authority was spread between the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, state banking regulators, insurance regulators, and the Securities & Exchange Commission. In some cases, such as derivative markets, no regulatory agency had oversight.
How does he discount greed? Let's work from the bottom up.
-As an individual home buyer, is it irrational, or even greedy to "take a chance" on buying a new house if no down payment is required and rates are low? The answer is no. People were able to own a home, move to better neighborhoods, and do so without risking much money. If the decision turned out badly, they would walk away from the chance with no potential economic loss.
-Banks knew there was a bubble early on, but how to react? Past bubbles saw corrections in price of 20% or less, so past history predicted most mortgage loans were safe bets based upon collateral values. Even the 100% loans were backed by insurance the banks assumed were solvent and reliable. If a bank got scared and scaled back lending, what would shareholders demand of management when other banks were making record profits? Money would have either left the "conservative" bank to those banks recording record profits, driving down the stock price of the "safe" bank, and management would have been replaced by shareholders for more aggressive leadership. Thus, most banks stayed on the train and held on for dear life. In short, management acted rationally in their own interest, and none of them could conceive of a system-wide bank failure since none had occurred in any of their life times. The downside was that their bank
might fail, but with FDIC insurance and pre-arranged mergers, depositors and shareholders would likely fare well even in failure.
--A mortgage lender or broker is being offered loan products by the likes of Countrywide and others where clients do not have to verify income if the loan to value is below 70%. Why did mortgage lenders offer those products? Because past history indicated very few borrowers default on loans where there is
considerable equity to lose. And, if the mortgage lenders were not requiring income verification, why would a broker turn a loan down if someone claimed too little non-verifiable income to qualify? If the lender stuck to the denial, which by law would reveal the reason for denial was "insufficient income", the borrower would simply move on down the road to the next broker and state a higher income in order to qualify.
The big "banks" buying these loans felt the collateral value predicted few defaults, and the brokers matching the loans to the lenders were not required to vet or verify the income. Now we bandy about the word "mortgage fraud" when applied to brokers and others, but in reality, it was the lenders offering the products that led people to lie on a loan application. Unethical on the part of the borrower? Yes. Fraud? How so, if income wasn't verified and everyone knew that. And how did the loan to value become 70% with no money down? Because the value of homes was rising so fast, a home costing $500,000 to build was actually appraising at $700,000 or more. Thus, we had a 70% loan with little or no money invested by the borrower.
--Builders were definitely not irrational. Spec homes (those built without being
pre-sold) were being snapped up before the homes were finished, and this trend had held from 2001 until 2006. Appraisals indicated the value of the home would be higher at completion than it was projected to be when the house was started. Loan rates were still cheap and creative,
down payments were minimal. And, the government
assured all of us, time and again, that there was no bubble. Greenspan spoke often on housing, and each and every time he dismissed the housing bubble as a danger. So, builders reacted to the market in a very rational manner.
--Investors in mortgage backed securities took the word of bond rating agencies (which had always been accurate during the previous 70 years) and invested heavily in the
MBS market. This included pension funds and even foreign governments. How is it greedy for an investment entity to seek out the best return, especially if said return is rated safe by heretofore respectable bond rating agencies?
As Duke
Geraghty said on my
Facebook page yesterday, it really wasn't greed, it was ignorance of the facts and dangers.
Finally, Bernstein is good from a historical
perspective. It explains how the evolution of risk assessment led to our thinking that our mathematical models were error-free, and led us to continue economic activities that our guts were telling us didn't make sense. If it seems too good to be true, it probably is.
Sorry for the long post, but do read these books. I think it will help us all going forward....until all of us in this generation are gone like those from the Depression era, and a new generation will make the same mistakes again.